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NOTES

Vacco v. Quill and the Debate Over Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Is the Right to Die Protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment?

INTRODUCTION

In Vacco v. Quill,' the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held
that New York's ban on assisted suicide does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the
Court held it would not recognize that any previously established
liberty interest 4 embodied the right to die.5 By so holding, the Court
has found that assisted suicide 6 is not a fundamental right, protected
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that there is an
"important, logical, and rational"' 8 distinction between the right to
withhold or withdraw life-support and the right to physician-assisted
suicide.9 The Court went on to state that "the Second Circuit erred in
reading New York law as creating a 'right to hasten death', instead,
the authorities cited by the Court recognized a right to refuse
treatment, and nowhere equate the exercise of this right with
suicide."' 0 The Court qualified its holding by saying that, although
' 521 U.S. 793, 1 f7 S.Ct. 2293 (1997), rev'g, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
2U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3See Vacco, 117 S.Ct at 2295.
4 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see
also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1967).
5 See generally Vacco, 117 S.Ct at 2295.
6 Inthis comment, "assisted suicide" and "physician-assisted suicide" are
used interchangeably unless specifically designated as referring to physicians or to the
administration of assistance by anyone.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
8 Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2301 (disagreeing "with respondent's claim that the
distinction between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide is
,arbitrary' and 'irrational'.").
9 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273; see also People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W. 2d
714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).
1oVacco, 117 S.Ct at n.7, (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125 (1914) (quoting Justice Cardozo, "every human being of adult
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there is no constitutional right to assist in a suicide, a state can
implement legislation that will protect physicians under limited

circumstances,"1 thereby encouraging the individual states to
experiment with legislation.' 2 Therefore, while declaring a ban on
physician-assisted suicide constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 13 the Court did leave the issue open to further debate at
the state level.

The background of Vacco v. Quill is examined in Part I, with
Section A addressing the lower court ruling 14 and Section B

addressing the United States Court of Appeals decision.'
Part II
analyzes the separate decisions in Vacco, addressing the majority
opinion 16 as well as the concurring opinions 17 in the Court's 9-0
decision.

The reaction at the state level, the effects of this

controversial decision, and some of the alternatives to physicianassisted suicide are discussed in Part 111.18 Finally, the conclusion can
be located in Part IV.' 9

years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.");
see generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (stating that this right to refuse treatment is based
upon the common law tort of battery, or the right to be free from unwanted touching or
medical attention, not the right to privacy or the freedom of liberty with respect to one's
body as found in the 14th Amendment).
11See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 2302
(1997) (O'Connor, J.,concurring) [hereinafter Vacco concurrence] The concurrences by
Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens, joined also by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
address both Vacco and Glucksberg which were decided together and while the opinions
for the Court are written separately, the concurrences are consolidated for the two cases.;
see id. at 2304 (Stevens J., concurring) (finding that the current decision does not
eliminate the possibility of finding the statute valid "in all or most cases in which it might
applied."); see id. at n.1 I (finding that physicians are protected when administering pain
medication to the extent that a patient's life is shortened).
12See generally Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2293.
13U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
14See infra notes 20-55.
15
See infra notes 56-135.
16
See infra notes 136-195.
17See infra notes 196-25 1.

infra notes 252-328.
19See infra notes 329-44.
18 See
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I. BACKGROUND OF VACCO V. QUILL

A. The Trial Court Ruling
On July 20, 1994, in the Southern District of New York, the
plaintiffs initiated the original complaint that later led to the Supreme

Court review. 20 Named as plaintiffs in Quill v. Koppe12 ' were three
physicians and three patients.22 The defendants named were the
Attorney General, the Governor of the State of New York, and the
District Attorney of New York County. 23 Plaintiffs called for a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of New York Penal
Law §§ 125.15(3), 120.30,24 which provided that if the physicians
were to aid in their patients' suicides, they would be open to
prosecution.
In turn, the defendants moved for a dismissal of the
action on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not presented a valid

claim.26 Because the court had considered facts outside the pleadings,

20

Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2293.
F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d

21 870

716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
22 The three physicians were Dr. Timothy E. Quill, Dr. Samuel C. Klagsbrun,
and Dr. Howard A. Grossman. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). The three patients names were Jane Doe, who died from thyroid cancer shortly
before the filing of the order to show cause, and Mr. Kingisey and Mr. Barth, who both
suffered from acquired immune deficiency syndrome and died during litigation. Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d at 719.
23 The original complaint was amended to include as defendants the Governor
and the District Attorney. See 80 F.3d at 721. New York Attorney General Koppel was
later replaced by New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco at the Court of Appeals
level. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court on certiorari, the three patient
plaintiffs had died leaving only the three physicians as the remaining plaintiffs. See 870 F.
Supp. at 80. 24
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987) provides that "A person is
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when ... (3) He intentionally causes or aids
another person to commit suicide." (Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C
felony). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 provides that "A person is guilty of promoting a
suicide attempt when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide."
(Promoting suicide is a class E felony).
25 See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 81.
26 Id. at 79.
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the court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment.27

The plaintiffs argued that a patient has a constitutional right to
end his or her life and that physicians have a "corresponding
constitutional right not to be Prosecuted for aiding a patient in the
exercise of the patient's right."' 8 Therefore, they argued, to the extent

that the New York law is applied to physicians aiding in "the
commission of suicide by a mentally competent, [or] terminally ill
adult wishing to avoid continued severe suffering," 29 the law is in
violation of the United States Constitution. 30 The patient plaintiffs
claimed that they were mentally competent adults who were being
forced to endure the gradual loss of bodily functions, due to suffering

from the progression of a terminal illness which effected their
physical integrity and increased their suffering. 31 Because of these
facts, they desired the aid of their physicians to prescribe medication
they would be able to administer themselves to hasten their own

deaths.32 The physicians maintained that "under certain circumstances
it would be consistent with [their] standards . . . to prescribe
medication to such patients which would cause death, since without
such medical assistance these ?atients could not hasten their death in a
certain and humane manner."
27

1d

21

Id. at 78.

29 Id.

Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 79.
id.
32 See id. at 80.
33 Id; see also Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of
Individualized Decision Making, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991) (detailing the facts
surrounding his decision to help one of his long-time patients commit suicide). Diane was
suffering from leukemia and expressed a reluctance to "linger in relative comfort." Id.
After determining that Diane was competent, Dr. Quill referred her to the Hemlock
Society where she requested a prescription for sleeping pills. Id. Dr. Quill' granted the
request and supplied the prescription with the understanding that before she used the
lethal dose of sedatives, they discuss it first. Id. By Dr. Quill's account, once Diane
knew she had the option to die when and how she chose, she was able to partake in and
enjoy her final days. Id. Dr. Quill's account of the assistance he rendered to Diane
prompted a grand jury investigation. However, he was never indicted. Id. See also
Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of... Time" 53 U.
PIT. L. REV. 153 (1991) (claiming that while public policy regarding the legalization of
assisted suicide does cause concern, ignoring the need for legalization will likely result in
30

31 See
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The court held that there was a justiciable question based on
the likelihood of prosecution 34 and the ensuing public controversy
represented by this issue. 35 The court cited Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat'l Union36 and stated that, for the constitutionality of a
criminal statute to be brought into question, the plaintiff does not need
to "first expose himself to prosecution." 37 The alleged intention of the
plaintiff to violate the statute coupled with the "credible threat of
prosecution"38 is sufficient to warrant review.39
The court analyzed the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
argument raised by the plaintiffs.4 0 The plaintiffs based their
argument on the holding in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey4 ' that there
are some rights so fundamental to a "person'[s] liberty, [personal
dignity, and autonomy] that governmental invasion is either entirely
prohibited or sharply limited. 42 In addition, the plaintiffs drew on the

more harm than good). "[W]e may be headed for a time when euthanasia will be
practiced more and more, whether or not the medical profession participates ...[i]f the
medical profession ignores the demand for easy death, people will resort to self-help,
which undoubtedly will cause its own incidence of abuse and mistake." Id.at 177.; see
also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 721 (1996) (contending that "[k]nowing what drug, in
what amount, will hasten death for a particular patient, in light of the patient's medical
condition and medication regime, is a complex medical task ...It is not uncommon...
that patients seeking to hasten their deaths try to do so without medical advice ... very
often... find themselves in worse condition than before the attempt. Brain damage, for
example, is one
result of failed suicide attempts.").
34
See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 78, 82.
31See id.
36 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
" See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 81.
38Id.
39See id. at 82. The court also referred to Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (asserting that all that was necessary was
that "the physician plaintiffi's claim] presented a justiciable controversy."). The court
further stated that because Dr. Quill had previously been brought up on grand jury
proceeding, although not indicted, there was a likelihood of prosecution. Id.
40 See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 82.
4' 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

42 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 82 (stating that some of the rights previously
afforded constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.").
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legal reasoning in Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health,4 3 that a
competent person has a constitutional right to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment. 44 The plaintiffs maintained that "it follows inevitably that
there is a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide under the
circumstances and manner at issue here." 4 5 The plaintiffs argued that
the Equal Protection Clause was violated because, under New York
Penal Code §§ 125.15(3) and 120.30,46 a competent person may refuse
life sustaining treatment, even if it results in death, but a competent
person may not choose to attempt suicide without being subject to
prosecution. 47
However, despite the court's finding of a justiciable question
the court rejected the above analysis, denied the plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunction and granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss. 4 8 The court based its decision on two legal premises. The
first premise was that the plaintiff had read Cruzan too broadly.49 The
court's rational stems from a line of cases, which read in conjunction,
assert that "[t]he Supreme Court has been careful to explain that the
abortion cases, and other related decisions on procreation and child
rearing, are not intended to lead automatically to the recognition of
other fundamental rights on different subjects . . . 'not readily
identifiable in the Constitution's text'." 50 With respect to Cruzan, the
court went on to state that the Supreme Court had drawn a legal
distinction between withdrawing life-support and actively seeking

4' 497 U.S. 261. (1990) (holding there must be clear and convincing evidence

that the incompetent patient would have wanted to withdraw the life-support devices and
that this evidence was lacking in the present case). In so holding, the court did recognize
the right for a competent person to refuse or withdraw life-support. Id.
4See id.

45 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 83.
46 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84 (citing Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485 (1986); In
Re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 74 (1981); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125
(1914)).

48 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 85.
49 Id. at 83 (stating that the Court in Cruzan had not gone so far as to
recognize a constitutional right to die, or even to terminate life-support).
50
Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Paris Adult Theater I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)).
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assistance in committing suicide.5 ' The second premise was that if the
court were to extend the protection of the Constitution to cover rights
that were not explicitly within the Constitution, these rights would
have to be indispensable to an "ordered liberty," 52 and "deeply rooted
in the nation's history and traditions. 5 3
The court based its holding on the fact that there is a
reasonable and rational distinction for the State to make between

actively seeking death and allowing the underlying disease to run its
course. 54 In addition, the fact that historically, there is no precedent

under common law supporting suicide
prompted the district court to
55
resolve the issue in favor of the State.

B. Quill v. Vacco: The UnitedStates Court of Appeals Decision
On September 1, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit reversed, in part, the judgment of the lower court.56
The Second Circuit based this reversal upon the finding that the New
York criminal statutes 57' violated the Equal Protection Clause 58 as the
S See id. at 83;

but see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296, 297 (examining the

distinction between action and inaction, Justice Scalia stated "[s]tarving oneself to death
is no different from putting a gun to one's temple as far as the common-law definition of
suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases is the suicide's conscious decision
to 'put an end to his own existence'."); cf Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 728 (rejecting the
argument that the distinction between withdrawing life-support and actively ending life is
arbitrary).
52See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 83 (asserting that a right must be so entrenched
in our society so as not to infringe upon "liberty nor justice").
53 Id. at 83 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977)).
54 Id. at 84 (asserting that "[I]t is hardly unreasonable or irrational for the
State to recognize a difference between allowing nature to take its course, even in the
most severe situations, and intentionally using an artificial death-producing device").
55 See Quill 870 F. Supp. 78; see also JAMES M. HOEFLER, DEATHRIGHT:
CULTURE, MEDICINE, POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 21-22 (Westview Press 1994)

(claiming that Americans are unique in their fear of death, while other cultures such as the
Japanese and Buddhist cultures actually welcome death); but see G. STEVEN NEELEY, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE: A LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 34
(Peter Lang Publ. 1994) (giving a complete historical overview of suicide from the time
of Plato and Aristotle).
56 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'g 870 F. Supp. 78
(S.D.N.Y 1994), cert. granted,117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
57 See supra note 24.
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statutes were "not rationally related to any legitimate state interest." 59
The court held "that physicians who are willing to do so may

prescribe drugs to be self-administered by mentally competent
patients who seek to end their lives during the final stages of a
terminal illness." 60 The Second Circuit included a summary of the
arguments heard in the lower court6' and highlighted the declarations
from Dr. Quill 62 and the patients. 63 At this point, one of the plaintiffs
had already died and the other two were in the final stages of AIDS.64
The Second Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling that there
was a justiciable controversy for the reason cited below.65 However,
the court went into an elaborate analysis of the standard of review
used for fundamental rights.6 6
The court relied on Bowers,6 7
6
8
69
Moore, and Palko v. Connecticut, with additional support for its
holding drawn from Griswold v. Connecticut7 ° and Reno v. Flores.7 l
58

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
'9 Quill, 80 F.3d at 716, 731.
60Id. at 718.
61See id. at 719, 720.
62 Id. at 718-722 (indicating that Dr. Quill's argument focused on the fact that
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a liberty interest to order one's life, and therefore,
the physician has a right to aid in that process for their terminally ill, but competent
patients who seek assistance in committing suicide). Dr. Quill states that the laws
discriminate by allowing a competent person on life-support to have an active role in
choosing to die, yet a terminally ill competent person cannot make essentially the same
decision. Id. Dr. Quill claims that physicians currently make these very same decisions
every day when they decided to withdraw life-support. Id. In addition, he makes the
argument that due to the advances in medicine, it is an increasingly complex task to
ascertain what dosage of medicine is required to bring on death, and absent physician
advice, the consequences from a failed suicide can in fact worsen the patient's condition.
Id. See generally Quill, supra note 33.
63 Quill, 80 F.3d at 720-21.
64 Id. at 720 (stating that Jane Doe had died prior to the filing and plaintiffs
Kingsley and Barth were the two remaining patient plaintiffs).
65 Id. at 723 (claiming that there was ajusticiable controversy since Dr. Quill
had in the past been brought before the Grand Jury).
66 Id. at 726-27 (reiterating the level of review under strict scrutiny,
intermediate level scrutiny, and the rational relationship test).
67 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6' 431 U.S. 494 (1977).

69 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
70 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
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The court stated that "[the court] is most vulnerable and comes nearest
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution. 72 Because of the court's position in the "judicial
hierarchy [it felt] constrain[ed] [and was] even more reluctant than the
[Supreme]
Court to undertake an expansive approach in this uncharted
73
area."
The court analyzed precedent to determine which level of
scrutiny to apply. 4 In so doing, the court relied upon established
doctrine in the area of fundamental rights, which required that when
determining the constitutionality of statutes that interfere with the
rights of a suspect classification or interfere with a fundamental right,
strict scrutiny should be applied. 75 The court reiterated the fact that
certain equal protection guarantees warrant an intermediate level of
scrutiny and cited to cases based on gender or illegitimacy.76 In
applying the test for intermediate scrutiny, the court required that the
statute or regulation in question bear a substantial relationship to an
important or compelling state interest. 77 However, the court
concluded that, assisted suicide is not a fundamental right included in
72 Quill, 80 F.3d at 724 (stating that "[As] in Bowers, the statutes plaintiffs
seek to declare unconstitutional here cannot be said to infringe upon any fundamental
right or liberty."). The court referred to the fact that at common law, suicide or assisted
suicide has always been in crime, although it is no longer prosecuted. Id. The court found
this analogous to the sodomy statutes at issue in Bowers. Id.; but see JAMES M. HOEFLER,
Policy Activism and Medical Technology: Emergence of the Right to Die Scenario in
DEATHRIGHT: CULTURE, MEDICINE, POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE (Westview Press
1994) (proposing the hypothesis that political activism with respect to the Right-to-Die
movement is in line with the advances in medical technology, basically inferring that
times have changed).
"
74 Quill, 80 F.3d at 725.
See id. at 725-27.
75 See id. at 726 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1986)); see generally Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (stating suspect classes are identified by race, lineage, or national origin); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (stating fundamental
rights are derived explicitly or implicitly from the Constitution).
76 Quill, 80 F.3d at 726.
77 See id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 723-724 (1982)).
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the Constitution, nor has any state recognized the right to suicide. 8
Therefore, the court held that the correct standard to be applied in the
79 between the statute
present case is that of a rational relationship
80
interest.
state
the
and
being challenged
The court refused to find a fundamental interest in assisted
8
suicide. ' However, using the rational relationship standard as applied
to social welfare policy,8 2 the court still found the statute to be
unconstitutional because:
1) the statutes in question fall within the category of
social welfare legislation and therefore are subject to
rational basis scrutiny upon judicial review; 2) New
York law does not treat equally all competent persons
who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to
hasten their deaths; 3) the distinctions made by New
York law with respect to such persons do not further
any legitimate state purpose; and 4) accordingly, to the
extent that the statutes in question prohibit persons in
the final stages of terminal illness from having
assistance in ending their lives by the use of selfadministered, prescribed drugs, the statutes lack any
rational basis and are violative of the Equal Protection
83
Clause.

78 Quill, 80 F.3d at 724.
79See id.at 725 (citing City of Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 440,
the court maintained that '"The general rule, then, is that state legislation carries a
presumption of validity of the statutory classification if "rationally related to a legitimate

state interest.").
80 See

id.at 726.

s See id. at 724.

82See id. at 726 (citing Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986)).
83 Quill, 80 F.3d at 727; but see Brief of Amicus Curiae for Petitioner,

Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2302 (1997) (No.96-110) (arguing that once
assisted suicide statutes are found constitutional, there is no clear way to draw the line
and protect the terminally ill).
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The court continued by stating that there is little or no
difference between
physician-assisted suicide and the withdrawing of
84
life-support.

[T]here is nothing "natural" about causing death by
means

other

than

the

original

illness

or

its

complications. The withdrawal of nutrition brings on
death by starvation, the withdrawal of hydration brings

on death by dehydration, and the withdrawal of
ventilation brings about respiratory failure . ...

It

certainly cannot be said that the death that
immediately ensues is the natural result of the
progression of the disease or condition from which the
patient suffers.85
Moreover, the court found that the state could have no

possible interest in prolonging a life that has digressed to an existence
rife with pain and suffering. 86 Citing In the Matter of Quinlan8 7 and
Planned Parenthood,8 the court found that patients have a right to

control or order their own lives and no state interest outweighs this
right. 89

In fact, the court questioned the legitimacy of any state
14 Quill 80 F.3d at 729 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-97 (Scalia,

J.,

concurring)) (noting that the distinction between assisted suicide -and removal of lifesupport is arbitrary because the underlying desire in both cases is the ultimate death of the
terminally ill patient).
85Id.; see also Newman, supra note 33, at 166 (noting that "It is sometimes
claimed that the 'passive' techniques are morally acceptable because they allow for a
natural death, while 'active' techniques independently cause death. But, in the modem
medical setting, these terms and distinctions are ephemeral. The concept of natural death
in a hospital has lost its meaning.").
86 Quill, 80 F.3d at 729-30.; see also Newman, supra note 33, at 166
(indicating that "[g]iven its power to manipulate and prolong death, modem medicine
cannot avoid responsibility for the fates of patients after physicians treat them, keep them
alive, find no cure and then give them no hope."). See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "The various opinions in this case portray quite
clearly the difficult, indeed agonizing, questions that are presented by the constantly
increasing power of science to keep the human body alive for longer than any reasonable
person would want to inhabit it.").
87355 A.2d 647, cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
88505 U.S. 833 (1992).
89 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
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interest in prolonging a person's suffering. 90 With respect to the state
interest in avoiding the slippery slope towards euthanasia, 91 the court
posited that even if physicians practice involuntary euthanasia,9 2 this
court believes that it is possible to establish guidelines that avoid such
ramifications.93 Likewise, the court dismissed the arguments that the
terminally ill would be subjected to "psychological
pressure" 94 and
' !
"killers."
that physicians would become
In conclusion, the Second Circuit found that the lower court
had erred in its decision that the New York criminal statutes did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.9 6 The court
based its reversal on the fact that there was no legitimate state interest
90 Id. at 730. "[W]hat business is it of the state to require the continuation of
agony when the result is imminent and inevitable?". Id.
91 See id. at 730; see also John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands:
Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1997) (claiming that despite stringent regulations, non-voluntary

euthanasia is being performed in the Netherlands at an alarming rate). "Within a decade,
the so-called strict safeguards against the slide have proved signally ineffectual; nonvoluntary euthanasia is now widely practiced and increasingly condoned on the
Netherlands." Id.; see id (citing Dan Callahan and claiming "The Dutch situation is a
regulatory Potemkin village, a great faqade hiding non-enforcement."); but see Gina
Kolata, 'Passive Euthanasia' in Hospitals Is the Norm, Doctors Say, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 1997, at AI0 (noting that "What might be called managed deaths, as distinct from
suicides, are now the norm in the United States... 70 percent of the deaths in hospitals
happen after a decision has been made to withhold treatment.").
92 Quill, 80 F.3d at 730; see also Gina Kolata, Ethicists Struggle Against the
Tyranny of the of the Anecdote, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997 at C4 (recalling a recent story
of a Dutch doctor who involuntarily ended the life of a female patient who was dying
from disseminated breast cancer because she would have died within a week and he
needed the bed sooner than later); see John Keown, The Tragic Truth About Dutch Death,
in AN EASEFUL DEATH? PERSPECTIVES ON DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA, 172, 179-82
(John Morgan ed., 1996). "Although the guidelines require an explicit request by the
patient, many of the patients killed in 1990 had made no such request .
[His survey
stated that] there was no explicit request in 5,450 of the 10,558 cases." Id.
9' Quill, 80 F.3d at 730; see also Newman, note 33 at 166 (stating that
devising regulations is a difficult task, but it can be done; regulations that require
informed consent, a waiting period, and mandatory disclosure to the family are some of
the options).
14 Quill, 80 F.3d at 730 (claiming that there can be just as much pressure on a
terminally ill patient to withdraw their life-support as there can be to hasten their death).
95 Id. (maintaining that the physician is no more a killer by giving the patient a
prescription 96
than he is by withdrawing life-support).
Id. at 731.
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being served,97 the fact that these patients were in the final stages of
life,9 8 and that there is no difference between withdrawing life-support
and hastening death by other means. 99 In addition, the court found
that the New York statutes violated Equal Protection because
competent people have the right to request the withdrawal of lifesupport,10 0 but not the right to assistance in suicide. 0 1 The court
supported its rationale by stating that a competent person on lifesupport could exercise his/her right to have medical assistance in the
removal of life sustaining apparatus, while a competent person
suffering from a terminal illness not on life-support0 2did not have equal
access to medical assistance in ending his/her life.1
Circuit Judge Calabresi wrote a concurrence' 0 3 to the opinion
in which he addressed his "unwillingness to reach the ultimate Due
Process and Equal Protection questions."'1 4 In his concurrence, he
looked at both the tradition of assisted suicide and the history of antisuicide statutes. 10 5 He maintained that throughout history, there has
often been an unspoken understanding between a patient and a
physician that when the pain and torment of dying become
unbearable, the physician would prescribe medication to ease the pain,
even if that meant hastening the death of the patient.' 0 6 However, at
the same time, there have always been statutes on the books
prohibiting suicide and assisted suicide.'0 7
97 id.
98 Id.

99 Quill, 80 F.3d at 729; but see Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (arguing that "Logic
and contemporary practice support New York's judgment that the two acts are different,

and New York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat them differently.").
1oo See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265 (maintaining that an incompetent's wish to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment may be supported by the finding of "clear and

convincing evidence").

101 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.

'02 See id. at 729.
103Id. at 731 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
104 id.
'05 Id. at 732.
106 Quill, 80 F.3d at 732.
107See id. at 732 n.I (citing NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE
LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL

CONTEST 57 (1994)) (reporting that "No person has been convicted in New York State of
manslaughter for intentionally aiding or causing a suicide ....

The reluctance to bring
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The historical survey 10 8 performed by Judge Calabresi reached
several conclusions: "1) what petitioners seek is nominally still
forbidden by New York statutes; 2) the bases of these statutes have
been deeply eroded over the last one hundred and fifty years; and 3)

few of their foundations remain in place today."'10 9 Furthermore,
Judge Calabresi posited that the distinction between suicide lor0
assisted suicide and removal of life-support is "tenuous at best.""
After Cruzan, it is conceivable that, without a clear distinction
between assisted suicide and removal of life-support, there may be an
implied liberty interest."' "When legislation comes close to violating
fundamental substantive constitutional rights or to running counter to
the requirements of Equal Protection . . . there is, .

.

. [a] long

tradition of constitutional holdings that inertia will not do."'12 If, in
fact, this is the case and the New York statutes do violate the Equal
Protection Clause, then, Judge Calabresi indicated, the court has the

right to demand that3 the legislature justify the validation of the
statutes in question."
The Second Circuit used Cruzan,"14 Casey,115 and the Ninth
Circuit decision in Compassion in Dying v. Washington116 to clarify
such cases no doubt rests in part on the degree of public sympathy [such cases] often
arouse, and the resulting difficulty of securing an indictment and conviction.") ; but see
Hoefler, supra note 55, at 187-222 (tracing the state legislature's response to the Right-toDie movement and stating that clear cut legislation is difficult in this area, but there has
been a proliferation of living will statutes and statutes advocating natural death).
'0S See Quill, 80 F.3d at 732-35 (finding that there has been an erosion of
suicide and assisted suicide statutes that remain on the books, but that are not used to
prosecute, thereby implying that "suicide is a grave public wrong [but] not a crime."
(citing Hundert v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 244 A.D. 459
(N.Y. App. Div. 1935)).
'°91d. at 735.
110Id.; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
there is no difference between starving to death due to the removal of life-support or
committing suicide by the use of a gun).
.. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 297 (recognizing the liberty to withdraw lifesupport). If there is no clear distinction between withdrawal of life-support and assisted
suicide, then the constitutional principle of treating all like cases alike is invoked. Id at
261.; see also Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
..
2 Quill, 80 F.3d at 735.
113'id.

114Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
..Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
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that the New York statutes in question approach a per se violation of

both the 7fundamental Due Process rights and the Equal Protection
Clause."
Cruzan, therefore, teaches us that statutes that interfere
with an individual's decision to terminate life are
suspect under the Due Process Clause. The right to act
on that decision is one that may not receive ultimate
constitutional protection, however, depending on the
power of the state's interest and the clarity with which

those interests are expressed. Moreover, as Justice
Scalia in his concurrence points out, the Equal
Protection Clause also requires courts to examine
whether such statutes apply equally to "you and me" regardless of whether the prohibited activity interferes
with a 8fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect
class.'
The

present

appellate

court

decision

expanded

upon

Cruzan 119and Casey,120 by finding that statutes prohibiting physicianassisted suicide can potentially violate the Constitution., 2 1

The

majority based its conclusion on the premise that there is no
difference between "active" and "passive" assistance when it comes to

terminating one's life, and that terminating one's life is a liberty
interest based on the freedom to control one's own body.'

22

However,

716
9 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
"1

See Quill, 80 F.3d at 735.

Id. at 737.
"9 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
120 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (declaring that "choices
'

central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own existence.
...[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under the compulsion of the State.").
121See Quill, 80 F.3d at 731 (stating that the present opinion expands on
Casey and Cruzan by broadening the constitutional protection of the 14th Amendment to
allowing a competent person the right to have a physician prescribe lethal amounts of
medication that can then be self-administered).
122See generally HENRY R. GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE: POLICY INNOVATION

AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 8-11 (1992) (noting that "Terms such as the right to die with
dignity, death with dignity, a natural death, passive euthanasia, and abating treatment are
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the concurrence stated that even if the laws "are highly suspect," there
is nothing in either Cruzan or Casey or the Constitution that that

makes them invalid. 123 Judge Calabresi "contend[ed] that when a law
is neither plainly unconstitutional, . . nor plainly constitutional, the
courts ought not to decide the ultimate validity of that law without

current and clearly expressed statements,
by the people or by their
' 24
involved."'
states
the
of
elected officials,
Judge Calabresi asserted that the statutes in question border on
violating the Constitution.' 25 The fact that statutes remain on the
books, but are not enforced, not only erodes the statutes' strengths, but
also indicates the lack of a legitimate state interest in the preservation
of life through prohibiting assisted suicide. 126

Judge Calabresi

concluded that if the state does not intend to uphold the anti-suicide
statutes, there could be no compelling state interest.' 27 Furthermore,
there can be no reasonable relationship between the state interest
to
28
promote life and the personal liberty interest set forth in Cruzan.
In conclusion, Judge Calabresi contended that these statutes

are in violation of both the Due Process Clause and the Equal

all used to convey a similar but often unclear notion of an ideal environment for and form
of final treatment .... [a]ctive euthanasia occurs when doctors or others act directly to end
a patient's suffering before a natural end to life .... [active euthanasia is further split into]
voluntary [where the patient requests the aid of another in ending his/her life and]
involuntary [where] others take it upon themselves to kill the suffering patient.").
12 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 728 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (requiring that there
be a balancing between the state's interest in prolonging life and the patient's interest in
ending their life).
114 Id at 738.
125Id (citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting)). "[M]ore is required of legislatures than a vague delegation to be filled in
later by mute acquiescence." Id.
126Quill, 80 F.3d at 740.
127Id. at 735 (stating "The Legislature -

for many, many years -

has not

taken any recognizably affirmative steps reaffirming the prohibition of what petitioners
seek."); but see Mazen, et al., Suicide: A ConstitutionalRight?, 24 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1,
205-10 (1985) (arguing that it has always been a illegal, by either statute or common law,
to assist in the act of suicide in the state of New York).
128 Quill, 80 F.3d at 741. "Whether under Equal Protection, or Due Process,.
the absence of a recent, affirmative, lucid, and unmistakable, statement of why the state
wishes to interfere with what has been held by the Supreme Court to be a significant
individual right, dooms these statutes." Id.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.129 However, despite
this finding, Judge Calabresi declined to decide the case on the

merits.1 30 He narrowed his opinion by stating that there may be a time
in the future, if New York were to rewrite and uphold the anti-suicide
13
laws, that these statutes might then pass constitutional muster.'
Furthermore, relying on Compassion in Dying,132 he maintained that
"[t]o declare a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide would

be to impose upon the nation a repeal of local laws,"'' 33 thereby
adopting the same "state's rights" argument that Justice O'Connor
34

later puts forth in her concurrence to the Supreme Court decision.
In the end a constitutional remand does no more than
this: It tells the legislature and executives of the
various states, and of the federal government as well,
that if they wish to regulate conduct that, if not

protected by the Constitution, is very close to being
protected, they must do so clearly and openly. They
must, in other words, face 35the consequences of their
decision before the people.'

2

9 Id. at 743.
80 F.3d at 743 (discussing the "extreme difficulty" that this decision

130Quill,

brings when considering the fact that there is no clear distinction between the right to die
and the removal of life-support, and the fact that both these concepts are relatively new to,
not only the courts, but also the medical profession).
131Id. at 740 (assuming that by upholding the statutes, New York State would
exhibit a legitimate state interest). "It is possible, for example, to imagine a state in which
such statutes were part of an overall approach to the preservation of life that was so allencompassing that the laws' validity might be upheld despite their infringement of
important libertarian individual rights." Id.
132Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
133 Quill, 80 F.3d at 743.
114 See 117 S. Ct. at 2302 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
"[T]he. . . challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding... liberty
interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the states... in the first instance." Id.
135Quill, 80 F.3d. at 742; see generally Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2297 (supporting
the premise that if a statute is close to being a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
that it should not justbe mutely passed but rather subjected to a higher level of scrutiny).
However, because the Court does not recognize a liberty interest in the right to assisted
suicide, the N.Y. Statute was only subject to a rational basis level ofjudicial scrutiny. Id.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

528

[Vol. XV

II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

A. ProceduralHistory Surroundingthe Grantingof Certiorari.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
heard oral arguments in this case on September 1, 1995 and decided
the case on April 2, 1996.'36 Its ruling had reversed the lower court,
holding that New York state discriminates against competent
terminally ill persons who are not on life-support because they are not
afforded the same option to end their lives that terminally ill patients
on life-support are offered. 137 In addition, the Second Circuit found
that no rational relationship existed between the unequal treatment
On November 12, 1996,
and any legitimate state goal. 3 8
petitioners 139 submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States a
petition to grant a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.' 40 Respondents 14 1 submitted their
brief on December 10, 1996. Reply briefs were filed with the
Supreme Court on December 26, 1996.142
On January 8, 1997, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
from Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco for the petitioner, Laurence
H. Tribe for the respondent, and General Walter Dellinger, Acting
Solicitor General, as Amicus for the United States. 143 In addition,
144
there were more than 50 Amicus Curia briefs filed with the Court.

136 Quill, 80 F.3d at 716.
137 See id.

See id.
139Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York; George E.
13

Pataki, Governor of the State of New York; and Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney
of New York County, Petitioners.
140
See Petitioner's Brief 1996 WL 656345.
141Timothy E. Quill, M.D., Samuel C. Klagsbrun, M.D., and Howard A.
Respondents.
Grossman, M.D.
142 See 1996 WL 739259.'
141 See 1997 WL 13672.
4 id.
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Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the Court on June
4
1

26, 1997.

The respondents

reiterated their argument

that it was

completely within their rights as physicians to be free from
prosecution for aiding their mentally competent patients during the
final phases of terminal illness, even if that required relieving a
1 46
patient's suffering through the prescription of a lethal medication.
Respondents also claimed that the ban on physician-assisted suicide
violates Equal Protection because terminally ill patients on life
support are permitted to end their lives by the removal of life support,
but those not on life support do not have the same recourse.' 47 The
petitioners argued that there is a strong state interest in the

preservation of human life; and in addition, that there is a distinct
difference between removal of life support and the active
administration of a lethal medication.1 48 Therefore, the petitioners

argued, the 49ban on physician-assisted suicide does not violate Equal
Protection.1

B. Supreme Court Decision and Holding
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the Supreme
Court. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the
New York statutes do not violate the Equal Protection Clause as they
do treat all people equally. The Court stated that all people on life-

support, if competent, have the right to remove said life-support,
145 See Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2293. Of note is the fact that the terminally ill
plaintiff patients, now deceased, died without the help of their doctors.
146 Id. at 2296. "[lt would be 'consistent with the standards of [their]
medical practices' to prescribe lethal medication for 'mentally competent, terminally ill
patients' who are suffering great pain and desire a doctor's assistance in taking their own
lives, [and] they are deterred from doing so by New York's ban on assisted suicide." Id.
147 See id.
148 See Oral Arguments, 1997 WL 348037 at *3 (arguing that removal of life
support is "rationally distinguishable [from physician-assisted suicide] because it is
consistent medical practice.").
149 See id. at **2-21; see also id. at *10 (arguing that palliative care, or the
right to ease pain no matter what the effect may be, is permissible); but see Timothy
Egan, Assisted Suicide Comes Full Circle, to Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, October 26, 1996, at
AI, A25 (explaining the irony involved when proponents of the Death With Dignity Act
die in exactly the manner they fought to avoid).
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whereas no one who is not on life-support has the right to assisted
suicide.' 50 The Chief Justice asserted that most states have antisuicide statutes,' 51 and these statutes do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.152 The Supreme Court decision noted the district
court's finding that New York has an "obvious legitimate interest in
preserving life, and in protecting vulnerable persons,"' 153 and that this
type of issue is best resolved by the democratic process.' 5" The Court
agreed with the court of appeals' selection of the rational basis judicial
scrutiny test, yet still granted Certiorari.' 55
Chief Justice Rehnquist commenced his opinion for the Court
by stating that the Equal Protection Clause creates the obligation to
156

afford all "within the jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'

However, he proceeded to assert that the Equal Protection Clause does
157
not create any substantive rights and, quoting Plyer v. Dole,

concluded that all the states are required to do is follow the general
principle of "treat[ing] like cases alike, but [states] may treat unlike
cases accordingly."' 58 Additionally, the Court referred to the principle
set forth in Romer v. Evans159 that "[i]f a legislation classification or
distinction 'neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
IS0See Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2297(1997) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,

319 (1993); New York Transit Authority v. Beazer 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979); Personnel
Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-73 (1979)) "Many [laws] affect
certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently." Id.
is1 See JAMES M. HOEFLER, supra note 55, at 187-222 (providing statutory
analysis of anti-suicide and living will statutes).
1"2 Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293 at 2295 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg 117 S.
Ct. 2302 (1997), ante at 4-15).
...
Id at 2297 (citing Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 78, 84-85).
14 Id. at 2297; see Quill, 80 F.3d at 743 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (stating
that the merits of the case should not be reached due to the inherently difficult nature of
the task).
"' Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2297 n.5 "The court acknowledges that because New
York's assisted suicide statutes 'do not impinge in any fundamental rights [or] involve
suspect classifications,' they were subject only to rational-basis judicial scrutiny." Id.
6 Id at 2297 (citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that no person may be denied
the equal protection of the laws)).
i 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
158 Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2295 (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
"9 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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class, we will uphold it so long as it bears some rational relationship
to some legitimate end'. ' 6 °
Relying on San Antonio School Dist.,161 Heller v. Doe,162 and
New York City TransitAuthority v. Beazer,163 Chief Justice Rehnquist
further held that while the New York statutes "address matters of
profound significance to all New Yorkers ... , [they do not] infringe
164
[upon] fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications.''
When deciding if a right is fundamental the Court is required to look
to the Constitution, not the individual assertion of the "importance" of
the right in question. 165 Because the right to suicide is nowhere in the
Constitution, the Court concluded that the New 66
York statutes are valid
Clause.'
Protection
Equal
the
violate
not
do
and
In reply to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the New
York statutes treat terminally ill patients on life-support differently
from terminally ill patients not on life-support, 6 7 the Supreme Court
asserted that this conclusion rests on the finding that there is no
difference between terminating life by removing life-support and
hastening death by physician-assisted suicide. 68
However, the

160 Vacco,

(1996)).

161

117 S. Ct. at 2297 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620

411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (asserting that when deciding if a right is

fundamental, the Constitution should guide, not the importance of the right being
asserted).
162

509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (stating that if the laws are dealing with rights

that are not suspect, then the laws will be afforded a strong presumption of validity).
163

440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (claiming that laws which apply across the

board will be presumed to be within the Equal Protection Clause); see also Personnel
Administrator of Mass., 442 U.S. at 256 (claiming that even though a law may have
unequal effects, it will be upheld if the unequal effects are not a result of unequal
treatment).
164 Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2297.
165id.

166See
167See

id.
Quill, 80 F.3d at 716, 729 "In view of the foregoing, it seems clear

that New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons alike: Those in the final
stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to hasten their
deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly situated,
except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten
death by self-administering prescribed drugs." Id.
168 See Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2298.
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Supreme Court did not endorse this finding. 69 Relying on various
sources from the medical community,170 the majority concluded that
the withdrawal of life-support is not contrary to the physician's
primary purpose, but administering lethal doses of medication is
contrary to medical ethics.' 7' Likewise, the Court stated that because
physician-assisted suicide is not endorsed by the medical community
and because there is a legal history of criminalizing suicide, a rational
distinction could172 be drawn between removal of life-support and
assisted suicide.
169 See id "Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction between
assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely
recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is both
important and logical: it is certainly rational." Id.
170 See id at n.6 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, 10 Issues in LAW &

MEDICINE 91, 93 (1994); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE, 267 JAMA 2229, 2230, 2231, 2233
(1992); When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Contest,
in NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, 104-09 (1994; Brief for the
American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 18-25).)
171See generally Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2298; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of
The National Right to Life Committee, Inc. in support of petitioners, No. 96-110, 1997.
"The medical community must 'be responsive not only to the concepts of medicine but
also to the common moral judgments of the community at large'." Id. (citing Quinlan, 70
N.J. at 44) "That physicians, who are supposed to be healers, must not become killers,
was thought to be resolved millennia ago with the Hippocratic Oath, which bars giving
'deadly medicine to anyone' and begins with 'First, do no harm'." Id. Margaret Mead is
quoted as saying, "Throughout the primitive world the doctor and the sorcerer tended to
be the same person. He with the power to kill had the power to cure ....
[t]his is a
priceless possession which we cannot afford to tarnish ... but society is always trying to
make the physician into a killer ....
[it is the duty of society to protect the physician
from such requests" Id.; but see Newman, supra note 33, at 153 (hypothesizing that the
medical profession could benefit from the involvement of doctors with their patients
during this highly emotional and painful time). "By avoiding the hopeless patient and the
family, the doctor learns to live with the brutality of prolonged suffering by disregarding
it. .

.

. [w]hat medicine seems to lack today is a mature acknowledgment of human

finitude, failed efforts, and the limits of human endurance ....
[w]hen healing becomes
impossible, other things begin to matter more than continued existence." Id. at 176.
172 See When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
Medical Contest, in NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, 56 (1994)

(claiming that generally the medical profession has embarked on a debate concerning the
ethical implications, but they are not ready to endorse physician-assisted suicide as
suicide is still illegal and there is fear of the ramifications). "Current New York law
classifies assisting a suicide as an independent criminal offense." Id.
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Based on its finding that a distinction between assisted suicide
and the removal of life-support, the Court found ample reason to
uphold the statutes, even if there are "uneven effects upon particular
groups within a class." 173 Chief Justice Rehnquist supported this
distinction by finding that "[t]he distinction comports with
fundamental legal principles of causation and intent . . .. [W]hen a
patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from the
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal
medication prescribed by the physician he is killed by that
medication."' 174 Chief Justice Rehnquist made the further assumption,
based on State School v. Saikewicz, 175 that a patient's intent when
demanding the withdrawal of his or her life-support may not be to die,
but may simply be a desire to live the rest of his or her days without
the encumbrance of life-sustaining machinery. 176 However, Chief
Justice Rehnquist asserted that there is no disputing the intent of both
the patient and the physician when the patient actively seeks a
terminal dose of medication. 77 "The law has long used actor's intent
or purpose
to distinguish between acts that may have the same
178
result."'

Chief Justice Rehnquist reinforced this intent argument by
referring to such precedent as In re Quinlan,179 in which the state
court found a "distinction between self-infliction of deadly harm and a
self-determination against artificial life-support."'180 However, there is
' Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2298 (citing Personnel Administrator of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-73 (1979)).
14 Id. at 2298 (citing People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 470-72 (1994);
Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 355 (1985); American Medical Association, CouNcIL ON
ETHICAL AND JuDICIAL AFFAIRS, PHYSICIAN-ASsISTED SUICIDE,

10 Issues on LAW &

MEDICINE 91,92 (1994)).
175 373 Mass. 728 (1997).
176 Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2298.
177
Id.

178 Id. at 2299 (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980)) (stating
that the distinction is drawn where the person knows the result of his actions as opposed
to actually desiring the outcome); see also Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250
(1952) (claiming that "distinctions based on intent are "universal and persistent in mature
systems of law").
179 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub. nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
"0 Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2299 (citing Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 665, 670 and n.9).
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reason to question this distinction when considering the argument
raised in People v. Kevorkian18 1 that the Cruzan182 majority referred to
the distinction between the removal of life-support and the active
seeking of death by assisted suicide as constitutionally void and a
"meaningless exercise in semantic gymnastics."' 83 Still, Chief Justice
Rehnquist maintained that the Second Circuit was incorrect in the
assumption that Cruzan created a "right to hasten death' instead, the
authorities cited by the court recognize a right to refuse treatment, and
nowhere equate the exercise of this right with suicide."' 8 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist further reinforced the distinction between actively
seeking death and the termination of life-support with a number
of
85
state court decisions that have also recognized the distinction.
In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that "the
overwhelming majority of state legislatures have drawn a clear line
between assisting suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment by prohibiting the former and
permitting the latter."' 186 Therefore, "even as States move to protect
and promote patients' dignity at the end of life, they remain opposed
to physician-assisted suicide."' 87 Chief Justice Rehnquist rationalized
that, historically, New York has always upheld the common law right
to refuse treatment, but at the same time, the state has on the books
anti-assisted suicide statutes that date back to 1965,88 thus by
181447 Mich. at 471, n.8.

182497 U.S. 261 (1990).
183Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2299 (citing Kevorkian, 447 Mich. at 471, n.8).
184Id. at n.7 (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y.

125 (1914) (quoting Cardozo, J., ".. .'every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body,' was simply an informedconsent case.").
'85 See id. at n.8 (citing the state court decisions that have recognized a
distinction between withdrawal of life-support and self inflicted death).
186 Id. at 2300 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702).
187
Id. at 2300-01; see also Vacco 117 S. Ct. at n.9 (citing one federal statute
and fifty state statutes that deal with assisted suicide).
188 Vacco 117 S.Ct. at 2301 (maintaining that New York has consistently
acted to protect patient's right to control medical treatment while maintaining the ban on
assisted suicide); see N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2979 (McKinney 1994 & Supp.
1997) ("Do Not Resuscitate Orders"); see also N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-2994
(McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1997) ("Health Care Agents and Proxies"); see also N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 989 (McKinney 1994) (maintaining a clear distinction between "Killing"
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accepting both divergent bodies of law "[t]his Court has .
recognized, at least implicitly, the distinction between letting a patient
die and making that patient die."' 89 Within the framework of these
arguments, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the respondents'
argument that the distinction "between refusing lifesaving medical
treatment and assisted suicide is 'arbitrary' and 'irrational'." 1' 90 He
upheld the constitutionality of the New York statutes based on the
premise that "[b]y permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical
treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide,
New
19 1
York law follows a long-standing and rational distinction."'
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished between
assisted suicide and a physician honoring a patient's wishes not to
start life-support or to discontinue life-support by finding that when
withdrawing life-support the physician is within the law as all the
physician intends to do is to follow the patient's wishes, and likewise
"[t]he same is true when a doctor provides aggressive palliative care;
...

the physician's
purpose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his
192

patient's pain."'

Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that there is a
need for stronger evidence of state intrusion into the patient's freedom
to overrule the New York statutes,' 93 and that finding in favor of

and "Letting Die"); see generally NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT,: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA INTHE MEDICAL CONTEXT,

104-09 (1994) (discussion upholding this distinction based on the public policy
implications of endorsing assisted suicide).
189 Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2301 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261).
190Id. at 2302 (quoting Brief for Respondent 44).
9' Id. at 2301. Chief Justice Rehnquist further concluded that, while some
argue that terminal sedation and palliative care are merely covert forms of assisted
suicide, that in fact they differ from assisted suicide by the fact that "the concept of
pharmacotherapy is based on informed consent and the principle of double effect." Id at
n.1l.; but see Newman, supra note 33, at 165 (alleging that the double effect of
administering an amount of painkillers so high as to bring on death is no more than a legal
form of euthanasia).
192Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 n.12 (quoting Vacco at 2298-2299); but see
Newman, supra note 33, at 166 "[l]n the modem medical setting, these terms and
distinctions are ephemeral." Id.
'9' Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2302 n.13 (noting that, as was found in Glucksberg, for
a plaintiff to prevail in a showing that the New York law was unconstitutional there is a
need for stronger evidence of a violation of the plaintiff's fundamental rights).
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upholding the New York statutes was supported by "valid and
194
important public interests."'
New York's reasons for recognizing and acting on this
distinction--including prohibiting intentional killing
and preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining
physicians' role as their patients' healers; protecting
vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and
psychological and financial pressure to end their lives;
and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia.' 9
C. Justice 0 'Connor'sConcurrence
While all the Justices voted with the majority in this 9-0
decision, there were several concurrences of note on this very
controversial and emotionally charged issue. 196 The first concurrence
was by Justice O'Connor, which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer join
197
substantially for the reasons contained therein.
Justice O'Connor joined the Court's opinion because she
believed that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not
protect the right to commit suicide or that it creates a right to
assistance in committing suicide; this she agrees is based on "our
Nation's history, legal tradition, and practices [that] do not support the
existence of such a right."' 198 However, Justice O'Connor addressed
the respondents' narrower issue of "whether a mentally competent
person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally

'94Id.at

2302.

195Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2302 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); but see

Newman, supra note 33, at 164-91(discussing the morality of, and the need for physicianassisted suicide, what role the medical profession should play in protecting the patient's
rights, how the medical profession has prolonged mortality to the point of now needing to
address what to do with those patients who are living and suffering longer than what was
once the norm).
196 While this was a 9-0 decision, the opinion is in essence a plurality
decision due to the fact that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer filed opinions
that only concurred in the conclusion of the Court, and Justice O'Connor filed a separate
concurrence of which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined in part.
197 Vacco concurrence,117 S.Ct. at 2302 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19' Id.at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her
imminent death."' 199 She found that a "patient who is suffering from a
terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal
barrier to obtaining medication from qualified physicians, to alleviate
that suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness or
death."2 00 Although Justice O'Connor recognized the right of a
patient to live through the end of his or her life free of pain, she
maintained "that the state's interest in protecting those who are not
truly competent or facing imminent death, or those whose decisions to
weighty to
hasten death would not truly be voluntary, are sufficiently
20 1
justify a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide."
Justice O'Connor concluded her concurrence by stating that
we will all feel the brush of death at some point in time and that she is
confident that "the democratic process will . . . strike the proper
balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent
individuals ... and the State's interest in protecting those who might
seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure." 20 2 To this end, she felt
that the proper place for this debate is at the state level where "[s]tates
are presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of
physician-assisted suicide and other related issues. 20 3
D. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens wrote his own concurrence, primarily to assert
the conclusion that the present decision "does not foreclose the
possibility that some applications of the New York statute may

199Id.
200 Id.;

but see Newman, supra note 33, at 190 (stating that perhaps

terminally ill patients do not want to live under a cloud of drugs, and that at times the
capability of pain medication to alleviate all suffering breaks down).
201 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2302 (Stevens, J., and Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment); but see Newman, supra note 33, at 167-72 (describing ways to
avoid the untoward consequences regarding physician-assisted suicide, or the fear that
euthanasia will be coerced).
202 Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203 Id. (quoting Cruzan that "the ...challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding ... liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory of the state
...in the first instance").
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impose an intolerable intrusion on -the patient's freedom. 20 4
Furthermore, future cases may need to be decided on a case by case
basis. 20 5 Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor that this issue
should be debated at the state level, yet he asserted that, "I write
separately to make it clear that there is also room for further debate
about the limits that the Constitution places on the power of the States
20 6
to punish the practice."
Justice Stevens compared the moral and legal arguments
concerning capital punishment to the arguments before the Court
20 8
regarding the two state statutes. 207 In the capital punishment cases,
the statutes were not unconstitutional on their face. However, even
though the statutes were valid on their face, the Court still found that,
as applied in certain circumstances, they might consider the statutes
unconstitutional.20 9 In keeping with the analysis, Justice Stevens
"[did] not [want to] foreclose the possibility that some applications of
21
the [anti-assisted suicide] statute might well be invalid."
This rationale is based on the fact that when the Court decided
the constitutionality of the assisted suicide statutes, there was no
specific class of plaintiffs before the Court as all patient plaintiffs had
died by the time the two cases reached the Supreme Court. 2 11 Because
the plaintiff patients were no longer before the Court, and because of
the fact that, on its face, the statutes in question have a very broad
reach, it is conceivable that the statutes may be facially challenged in
2 12
the future by a different class of plaintiffs.
204 Vacco concurrence, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 n. 13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
205 id.

206 Vacco concurrence, 117 S. Ct.at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring).
207 Id.

208 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2304 nn.1-4 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
209 id.

210 Id. Of note is the similarity between this conclusion and that of Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence.
211Id.

212 Id.

"[Flacial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult

challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be invalid." Id. at 2304 (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
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Next, Justice Stevens considered the history and tradition
surrounding the decision not to "recognize an open-ended
constitutional right to commit suicide."213 He proclaimed that "[tihe
value to others of a person's life is far too precious to allow the
individual to claim a constitutional entitlement to complete autonomy
in making a decision to end that life. 214 Once again, as in the capital
punishment statutes, Justice Stevens left the door open for further
debate in the event that circumstances surrounding a challenge to the
statute differ from those before the Court. Although he was
"convinced that there are times when [the right to hasten death] is
entitled to constitutional protection," 215 he did not explicitly suggest
what those circumstances may be.
Justice Stevens did suggest that "[tihe liberty interest in a case
like this differs from, and is stronger than, both the common-law right
to refuse medical treatment and the unbridled interest in deciding
whether to live or die. It is an interest in deciding how, rather than
whether a critical threshold shall be crossed.2 16 Furthermore, he
maintained that finding a basis for this pivotal distinction in a person's
intent by taking into consideration a person's medical condition is
supported by practices already utilized in the medical community.
The illusory character of any differences in intent or
causation is confirmed by the fact that the American
Medical Association unequivocally endorses the
practice of terminal sedation - the administration of
sufficient dosages of pain-killing medication to
terminally ill patients to protect them from
excruciating pain even when it is clear that the time of
death will be advanced. The purpose of terminal
sedation is to ease the suffering of the patient and
213 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring).
214 Id.; but see Newman, supra note 33, at 181 (citing some of the reasons
why persons would want to exercise their right to end their lives as they see fit and these
reasons include: the wish to be remembered as a vital individual, the desire to not have to
withstand physical deterioration complete with excruciating pain, the reluctance to suffer
a loss of autonomy, and the desire not to deplete the family resources on -futile
healthcare).
215 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring).
21
6 Id. at 2307.

540

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XV

comply with [his or] her wishes, and the actual cause
of death is the administration of heavy doses of lethal
sedatives. This same intent and causation may exist
when a doctor complies with a patient's request for
lethal medication to hasten her death.217
Based on this "illusory distinction," Justice Stevens concluded
that there may be instances where the difference in causation and
intent is inapplicable and that these same statutes, given different
circumstances,
may "impose an intolerable intrusion on the patient's
28
freedom." 1
However, in considering the holding in Cruzan, Justice
Stevens did acknowledge that "Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse
treatment was not just [based on] a common-law rule ...[but also on

a] freedom [which] embraces, not merely a person's right to refuse a
particular kind of unwanted treatment, but also her interest in dignity,
and in determining the character of the memories that will survive
long after her death., 219 Therefore, it is conceivable that Justice
Stevens was foreshadowing the possibility that sometime in the near
future, the courts may be confronted with a scenario where the
patient's liberty interest, including the personal right to make this
extremely private decision, outweighs the state's interest to protect
against the abuses of assisted suicide. This hypothesis is further
supported by the rationale that the Cruzan decision never precisely
220
defined the "the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty,"
and as Justice Stevens acknowledged, the fact that the plaintiffs in this
case were not in a coma and were therefore fully aware of their
suffering, may be entitled to more of a liberty interest than Nancy
Cruzan because they sought to avoid the pain and humiliation of a
217Id. at 2310 (arguing that there is a distinction because the hastening of

death is a result of the administration of the pain medication, not the primary reason for
the administration of the medication);

Cf Quill, supra note 33 at 157 (arguing that the

intent with which a doctor prescribes a lethal dose of medication may be so that the
patient fears death less and can in fact partake in the last of his/her days free from the
thought of how it will all end).
218 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct at 2310.
2 19

d. at 2306.

220 Id. at 2307 (citing Cruzan, 497

U.S. at 261).
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22 1
to a terminal illness, of which they were fully aware.
because the plaintiffs died before the case came before the
compelling nature of their situation was not impressed upon
According to Justice Stevens,

although there is no absolute right to physicianassisted suicide, Cruzan makes it clear that some
individuals who no longer have the option of deciding
whether to live or die because they are already on the
threshold of death have a constitutionally protected
interest that may outweigh
the State's interest in
222
preserving life at all costs.
Thus, if there is more of a fundamental right the nearer one is
to death, then it would seem that Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument
that there is a distinction between withdrawal of life-support and
physician-assisted suicide is even further weakened.2 23
Justice
Stevens hypothesized that perhaps, had these patients lived to see their
day in court, they would have had an even stronger interest than that
of a patient who seeks to refuse medical treatment; here the patient
had no choice in the decision whether to die, but was deciding the
quality of that death by deciding how to die.22 4 Furthermore, by
implication, if one is to recognize that a competent person has a right
to refuse or withdraw life-support 225 based on her wish to protect her
dignity and how she will be remembered after her death,226 then does
it not go without saying that her implied intent when seeking the
cessation of life-support is to die with dignity? If so, then it would
follow that the intent behind the withdrawal of the life-support is to
221Vacco concurrence, 117 S. Ct. at 2307 (Stevens, J.concurring).
222 Id.

223This is based upon Justice Stevens' premise that the closer one is to death
the stronger, the fundamental liberty interest becomes, versus the fact that the state's
interest to prolong life is severely weakened when death is so near. Id. Although death is
inevitable for all of us, it would appear that Justice Stevens' is partial to a sliding scale
approach when deciding who should be granted the right to die. Id.
224 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2307-08. (Stevens, J., concurring).
225 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
226 See id.
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die, which means that Chief Justice Rehnquist's intent argument is
clearly misplaced.
The Court's argument that the state has a viable interest in
regulating assisted suicide may also be weakened if the case by case
approach that Justice Stevens proposes is adopted. Justice Stevens
claimed that "[t]he state interests supporting a general rule banning
the practice of physician-assisted suicide do not have the same force
in all cases." 227 He based this premise on the argument that the state's
interest weakens as the individual interest increases. 22' Generally, the
state has an interest in the contributions a person makes to society.229
However, this interest is skewed when the person faces the imminent
thought of death and is faced with the choice of how to die, not when
to die. 23 ' Therefore, it may be said that the closer a person is to death,
the more of a liberty interest
he or she has in determining the manner
23
1
die.
will
she
or
he
which
in
Other state interests that Justice Stevens considered are the
"interest in preventing suicide, protecting the vulnerable from
coercion and abuse, and preventing euthanasia . ,232 Justice
Stevens agreed these are valid state interests, but only if there are
signs of abuse or coercion. 233 It is feasible to say that the state interest
wanes when a situation involving a person who of his own volition,
seeks assistance in ending his life due to pain and infirmity. This
"does not mean that the lives of terminally-ill, disabled people have
less value than the lives of those who are healthy ...[only that]
proper recognition to the individual's interest in choosing a final
227Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2307 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).

228 See id. (claiming that "The state interests supporting a general rule
banning the practice of physician-assisted suicide do not have the same force in all
cases.").

229 See id.

230 See id. at 2307 (agreeing with the rationale in Cruzan that a person has a
right to determine how he/she will be remembered once he/she dies).
231See id.at 2308 (supporting the premise that there may be an argument for
a case by case analysis, but this also deals with the problem of who should be extended
the right to assisted suicide; conceivably, there could be an argument made for a sliding
scale based on the imminence of death and the pain being suffered).
232 Vacco concurrence, 117 S. Ct. at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring).
233See id.
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chapter that accords with her life story, rather than one that demeans
her values and poisons memories of her. 23 4
Finally, Justice Stevens looked at the state interest of
preserving the integrity of the medical profession.235 It is common
knowledge that there is a fear that giving doctors the right to
administer drugs in lethal doses will lead to euthanasia. 236 However,
there is an equally plausible argument that the integrity of the medical
profession is being eroded by the limitations placed upon physicians
when discussing the possibilities open to patients surrounding their
death.237 Justice Stevens advanced this argument by acknowledging
that doctors are "already involved in making decisions that hasten the
death of terminally ill patients - through termination of life support,
withholding of medical treatment, and terminal sedation. 238 He
continued by citing several studies that allege that physician-assisted
suicide is currently practiced, although it is against the law. 239 This
would seem to lend support to the proposition that perhaps it is better
to have physician-assisted suicide as an option that patients can
214Id.(citing R. DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION 213 (1993)) "Whether it is in
someone's best interest that his life end in one way rather than another depends on so
much else that is special about him - about the shape and character of his life and his
own sense of his integrity and critical interests - that no uniform collective decision can
possibly hope to serve everyone decently." Id.
235See Vacco concurrence, 117 S. Ct. at 2308; but see Newman, supra note
33, at 170,171 (stating that any interest in preserving the integrity of the medical
profession is rather weak as "[t]he erosion of trust in medical professionals and their
Reasons for this include doctor's poor
institutions is already well underway).
communications skills, unwillingness to spend time with individual patients, and
overreliance on technology ....Refusal to give aid in dying, however, may actually add
to the level distrust." Id.
236 See Keown, supra note 91 at 287. "The hard evidence of the [slurvey
indicates that, within a remarkably short time, the Dutch have proceeded from voluntary
to non-voluntary euthanasia. This is partly because of the inability of the vague and loose
[gluidelines to ensure that euthanasia is only performed in accordance with the criteria
laid down by the courts ...." Id. However, there may be a counterargument that
regulation will be more difficult if assisted suicide is driven underground. An example of
this is the apparent ease with which Dr. Kevorkian has repeatedly eluded the law.
237 See Newman, supra note 33, at 170,171.
238 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2309 (Stevens, J., concurring).
239 See id. at n.12.(citing statistics that 56-60% of physicians favored
legalizing assisted suicide, and that 18% to 24% of physicians who were asked to assist in
a patient's suicide did comply with their patient's request).
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discuss with their doctors rather than having to hide a practice that, for

all intents and purposes, is rather wide spread, albeit illegal.24 °
Justice Stevens concluded by saying that he does not agree
with the court of appeals ruling that the "state interests are invalid as
to the entire class of terminally ill, mentally competent patients. 2 4'
However, in keeping with Justice O'Connor's opinion, he asserts that
an individual could prevail in a challenge to the individual statutes-if
the circumstances
were different, and considered on a case by case
242
basis.
E. Justice Breyer's Concurrence

The last concurrence was written by Justice Breyer, who
stated that he places greater store in the legal significance of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence than he believes the Court does. 243 Although
he agreed with the Court that there is a justifiable distinction between
physician-assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-support, 244 he did

not agree with the Court's description of the liberty interest as being
the "right to commit suicide with another's assistance." 245 He
believes the6 interest would be better described as the "right to die with
24
dignity."
240 See Janny Scott, An Issue That Won't Die: Court's Ruling on DoctorAssisted Suicide Leaves Some Basic Questions Unresolved, N.Y.TIMEs, June 27 at
AI(stating that if there is any hope to be found in the Supreme Court decision, it is not
necessarily the outlawing of assisted suicide, but the increased, open discussion regarding
alternatives when faced with an end of life decision). "The Supreme Court may have been
unanimous, . .. but the decision does little to resolve the murky, practical concerns that
many Americans have about exactly they will die .... Both sides in the debate over
assisted suicide say the practice is likely to continue underground in the way doctors say
it has been done quietly for .years." Id.
241Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2309.
242 Id.at 2310. However, it is hard to make a rational argument for why the
statutes should hold here but may be invalidated at a later date, if only for the reason that
in the case before the court, the plaintiff patients were already deceased, should not their
families have something to show for their pioneering, other than increased torment during
the final stages of their life?
243 See id. "I believe that Justice O'Connor's views, which I share, have
greater legal significance than the Court's opinion suggests." Id.
244 See id. at 2311.
245 Id.

246 Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2311.
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When the interest is formulated as such, it is arguable that the
Fourteenth Amendment may protect such a liberty interest based on
the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment has, in the past, been
expanded to protect "related, but not identical, interests relating to
personal dignity, medical treatment, and freedom from state-inflicted
pain. 247 However, Justice Breyer maintained that the Court need not
reach this issue because the legality of administering palliative care,
even when there is the possibility of accelerating death due to a
double effect, 248 negates the interest a person has in avoiding
unnecessary pain.249

Therefore, Justice Breyer concluded that the

New York statutes in question do not bear directly on the central issue
of dying with dignity, if one believes dying with dignity is analogous
to dying without pain, 250 because the statutes in question do not limit
access to palliative care. However, this rationale was based on the
belief that dying with dignity is analogous to dying without pain. It is
feasible that a person may find a death in which he or she is sentenced
to live out 1the days in a drug-induced coma as being far from
25
dignifying.

247 Id. (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
261; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
248 See Don Stewart, Legislation, Ethics and Social Policy: The Case of
Dying With Dignity, in AN EASEFUL DEATH? PERSPECTIVES ON DEATH,

DYING AND

EUTHANASIA 160,167 (John Morgan ed., 1996). "[Tihe principle of double effect.. .is the
use of painkilling medication used with the intention of relieving pain even though such
use might incidentally shorten life . . . [t]he intention of the care-givers in such
circumstances are paramount ... " Id.
249 See Vacco concurrence, 117 S.Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
"[Wiere state law to prevent the provision of palliative care, including the administration
of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life - then the law's impact upon serious
and otherwise unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death) would be more directly at
issue." Id.; but see NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LEFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH
IS SOUGHT,: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT, 159 (1994)

"[Plain relief should not be seen as a technical panacea, sufficient to respond to all
patients. Pain relief is one aspect of a larger problem." Id.; see also Newman, supra note
33, at 170 (arguing that not all pain can be avoided by palliative care).
250 See Vacco concurrence, 17 S. Ct. at 2312.
251 See Newman, supra note 33, at 185. "For the incurably ill, losing
alertness, control, and even consciousness may not be acceptable as a way to prolong
existence." Id.
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III. REACTION TO THE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE ISSUE

A. Reaction at the Public and ProfessionalLevel
When considering the effect of the Vacco decision, scholars
are split on the long-term consequences; some view the decision as
"entrench[ing] the existing laws against assisted suicide, ' '252 while
others expect that within the next decade, many states will legalize
assisted suicide in one form or another.2 53 One thing is clear, this
emotionally charged issue will not easily slip from the spotlight.
Anti-assisted suicide groups have been formed, and gained
strength through alliances with right-to-life groups and religious
groups.2 54 While these groups seem to have the backing of the
American Medical Association, there is equal public support for
Right-to-Die groups. The American Civil Liberties Union and other
abortion rights activists support the existence of groups such as
Compassion in Dying and the Hemlock Society. 255 These groups fuel
much of the reaction to the Supreme Court decision, and many say
that, while the debate will be played out in the public arena, it will
come down to which side is better funded.25 6
One very vocal anti-assisted suicide group is "Not Dead Yet!",
a Chicago based disability rights group. 257 "Not Dead Yet!" argues
252 See Scott, supra note 240, at A19 (quoting Robert Sedler, Professor of
Law at Wayne State University, Detroit).
253 Id. (quoting Yale Kamisar, professor of constitutional and criminal law at
the University of Michigan); see generally Yale Kamisar, Physician-AssistedSuicide: the
Last Bridge to Active

Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL,

CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, 225 (John Keown, ed., 1995).
254 See Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facingthe FinalExit, A. B. A. J., Sept. 1997,
at 48, 50.
255 Id.
256 See Mike Mckee, A House Divided; Assisted Suicide Issue Likely to Go to
State Lawmakers Across the Nation; Rift Between Disability Rights Groups Could Shape
Battles Over Assisted Suicide in State Legislatures Nationwide, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV.,
July 25, 1997 at BI (quoting Andrew Batavia, a paraplegic attorney who is in favor of
recognizing assisted suicide as a fundamental right; "[f]rom now on, it's going to be a
matter of which
side can muster the greater political power.").
25 7
See Thomas Maier, This Group is Alive andKicking/ DisabledFight, Fear
Legalizing Suicide, NEWSDAY, June 6, 1997 at A8.
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that the legalization of assisted suicide puts the disabled in the
vulnerable, and possibly lethal position of being viewed by society as
a class of people who are better off dead.25 8 The group's fear is that
once physician-assisted suicide is no longer illegal, the disabled may
suddenly find themselves under pressure to end their lives as their
25 9
lives could be seen as more of a burden than an asset to society.
Barbara Coombs Lee of the Seattle group, Compassion in Dying has
addressed this argument by stating that "[i]t's a stretch to say that
because we would allow this for terminally
ill patients, we would
260
extend it to disabled people as well.
The effect of Vacco, with respect to catapulting the issue into
the limelight, is analogous to the situation created by Roe v. Wade,26 1
however, the debate over physician-assisted suicide did not start with
the Vacco decision. Presently, despite legitimate fears 262 and many
divided alliances, 263 polls suggest that approximately fifty percent of
the general public, 26 sixty-six percent of the disabled, 265 and ninety
percent of AIDS patients 266 want to see the legalization of assisted
suicide. 267 In a recent survey, sixty-six percent of the participants
would support their state's adoption of a law legalizing physicianassisted suicide for terminally ill patients; seventy-two percent were
against legislation that would limit a physician's ability to prescribe
lethal medication to terminally ill patients, as opposed to only twenty-

258
259

id.
id.

260 id.
261 See Egan, supra note 149 (describing assisted suicide as "an issue that
could be to the next century what abortion has been to this one...").
262 See Maier, supra note 257; but see Lowe, supra note 254 at 51.
"Proponents of assisted suicide such as Alan Meisel of the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law say legislation can protect patients who are under duress to hasten death."
Id.
263See Mckee, supra note 256 (claiming that groups will become more
polarized and vocal as the debate continues).
264See Lowe, supra note 254, at 51; see also infra notes 293-311 and
accompanying text (discussing the Oregon poll).
265See Mckee, supra note 256.
266
See id.
267See Lowe, supra note 254, at 51.
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However, no matter how

controversial and heated this debate has become, when studying
hospital records it appears that the practice,
while not openly
269
discussed by physicians, may already be here.

B. The Possible Effects of Driving Physician-AssistedSuicide
Underground

One of the most troubling aspects of banning assisted suicide
is that the choices surrounding the end of one's life are being
limited.27° Much of the concern regarding assisted suicide may be
seen as a direct result of advances in medical technology that prolong
life past any point previously possible. 27 1 Because these advances
prohibit patients from dying a natural death and potentially increase

the length of time that pain must be endured, many have approached
their doctors regarding assistance in committing suicide, and many of
these doctors have in fact helped. 272 The New York Times quoted Dr.

Quill as saying that he "thinks it will be business as usual with respect
to the underground practice [of physician-assisted suicide]. '' 273

The covert activities of Dr. Jack Kevorkian are prime
examples

of the

inflammatory

nature

of this

underground

268 See Assisted Suicide: Poll Shows Strong Support Nationwide, HEALTH
LINE, July 30, 1998, at Surveys & Polls (citing a study of 1,000 adults conducted by
Death With Dignity National Center, Compassion In Dying, and the Oregon Death With
Dignity Legal Defense and Education Center).
269 See Kolata, supra note 91, at AI0 (stating that approximately 70 percent
of hospital deaths are preceded by a decision to withhold medical treatment); see also
Egan, supra at note 149 (claiming that 25 percent of doctors have been approached to
prescribe life ending prescriptions and 25 percent of patients seeking help in ending their
lives have obtained that help.).
270 See discussion supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the
limits of the medical profession and the erosion of trust in medical professionals).
271 See Newman, supra note 33, at 166 (claiming that due to enhanced
medical techniques, doctors are granted the power to prolong life yet disassociate
themselves when salvation is unobtainable).
272 See Esther B. Fein, Handling of Assisted Suicide Cases Unlikely to Shift,
Officials Say, N.Y.TIMES, June 27 1997, at A19. "[M]any doctors concede in surveys that
they have helped dying patients to end their lives despite... prohibitions, the act goes
virtually unreported, uninvestigated, unprosecuted, unpunished." Id.
273Scott, supra note 240, at A19.

1999]

VACCO v. QUILL

549

movement. 274 In the past, Dr. Kevorkian has suggested that the
27 5
people he helps to commit suicide should partake in organ donation.
While this may be a benevolent idea, it adds fuel to the argument that
those in a vulnerable condition may be coerced into committing
suicide because their life is no longer worth living and, in fact, has
more value to someone else.276 It can also be said that our legal
system is somewhat misguided when, in the interest of protecting
human life, a doctor who is licensed to practice medicine cannot
administer pain medication sufficient to ease the pain of terminally ill
patients for fear of legal repercussion, 277 yet a retired pathologist who
assists people in committing suicide in vans, hotels, or even a church
can repeatedly escape conviction.2 78
Dr. Kevorkian has done much to further the Right-to-Die
movement, but Dr. Kevorkian's campaign to focus media attention on
the issue of physician-assisted suicide has proven his legal undoing.
On April 13, 1999, Dr. Kevorkian was given a sentence of 10 to 25
years, after a jury convicted him of second degree murder for the
administration of a lethal dose of a controlled substance that resulted
in the death of terminally ill Thomas Youk. 279 Dr. Kevorkian
videotaped the assisted suicide and the CBS television show "60
Minutes" aired the footage on November 22, 1998.
Former
Kevorkian prosecutor, Richard Thompson, maintained that Dr.
Kevorkian's motive may have been legitimate, but that the criminal

274 See Kevorkian Lawyer Hired in Death Case, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1997,
at AI0 (alleging that Dr. Kevorkian has assisted 45 deaths since 1990).
275 Richard Moran, MORNING EDITION, Nov. 18, 1997.
276 See Maier supra, note 257 and accompanying text (discussing the
vulnerability of terminally ill patients); but see Newman supra note 33, at 173 (claiming
that all decisions are made under societal pressures, but a person's desire to live should

not be underestimated).
277 Taking Better Care of the Dying, A. B. A. J., Sept. 1997, at 51 (stating that

the fear of prosecution is a huge fear and an obstacle in pain management); see also infra
notes 316-318 and accompanying test(discussing the ramifications of the pending bill THE
LETHAL DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION ACT).
278 Leo Standora, Dr. Death Helps City Woman Die, DAILY NEWS, Nov.14,

1997.
279 Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian Sentenced to 10 to 25 years in Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, April 14, 1999, at Al.

550

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XV

issue is one of intent not motive.2"' Dr. Kevorkian clearly intended to
assist in the suicide of Thomas Youk, and it is this assistance that is a
crime in Michigan. Mr. Thompson stated that prosecutors would be
compelled to vigorously prosecute the case because, in addition to
videotaping the incident, Dr. Kevorkian actually committed the act of
administering the lethal injection, as opposed to his previous assisted
suicides where the patient and not Dr. Kevorkian administered the
lethal medication."' Through out the trial, Dr. Kevorkian maintained
that he would be vindicated, however, this did not prove to be the case
and his latest publicity stunt seems only to have strengthened the
opposition as many see Dr. Kevorkian as having stepped over the
line.282
Whether or not one endorses the active use of assisted suicide,
an open discussion of the alternatives is warranted. Likewise, those
who choose to seek methods to end their life should be free to have
the options explained to them.28 3 It is in the area of palliative care that
Dr. Kevorkian may have done the most damage. Dr. Kevorkian has
focused this country's attention on the need to address the
helplessness that a terminally ill patient and his or her family face at
the hands of the medical profession. However, in furthering his
crusade for assisted suicide, Dr. Kevorkian has inadvertently created
the impression that the pain suffered by terminally ill patients is
unmanageable. To many this is defeat, "[t]he Kevorkian deception is
that most pain is uncontrollable, and that a doctor's only recourse is to
offer a quick exit via lethal injection.2 84 While pain management is

280 See Marsha Clark, Riveria Live: Trial of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, Charged
With First-Degree Murder, CNBC NEWS TRANSCRIPT, December 30, 1998 (discussing
the March 22, 1999 trial of Dr. Kevorkian).
281

Id.

See John Mclaughlin, One on One, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 12,
1998 (discussing Dr. Kevorkian's "wish for a show trial" and how Congress has reacted
by trying to "supersede state's rights on the issue" of assisted suicide).
283 See Lowe, supra note 254, at 52 (explaining that the problem with an
282

underground practice of assisted suicide is that there are no second opinions, and nobody
looking out for the best interest of the patients if they are weak and susceptible to
suggestion).
284 Joe Loconte, Relief for Suffering Instead of From Life, WASHINGTON
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at A17.
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not the solution in every situation, 2 85 many proponents of assisted
suicide are also in favor of increased palliative care. 286 No matter the
final answer, the "lack of candor about how the patient's death will
occur and under what conditions is the thing that's particularly
troubling. 2 87
C. PalliativeCare288 as an Alternative to Assisted Suicide
Public opinion on the subject of physician-assisted suicide is
highly polarized. However, both proponents and opponents see the
debate as a welcome opportunity to focus on the issue of pain
management. 28 9 Regardless of the eventual outcome of the debate,
activists predict that there will be an increased acceptance of "the
aggressive use of pain medication to ease suffering." 290 In keeping
with this prediction, statistics show that since Oregon passed the
Death with Dignity Act in 1997, the use of morphine has risen by
seventy percent, there has been a decrease in the number of patients
who die in the hospital, and a twenty-five percent increase in hospice
admissions. 291' Activists in Oregon realize that in order to prevent the
misuse of assisted suicide, they must narrow the class to which the
285 See Newman, supra note 33, at 185 (discussing the limitations of pain

management).

286 See Scott, supra note 240, at A19 (discussing support for advances in

palliative care).
287 Kolata, supra note 91, at 10.
28 See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1017 (5th ed. 1982) (defining
palliative care as care that is "mitigating; reducing the severity of; denoting the alleviation
of symptoms without curing the underlying disease"); see also Ian Maddocks, Hope in
Dying: Palliative Care and a Good Death, in AN EASEFUL DEATH? PERSPECTIVES ON
DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA, 57,61 (John Morgan ed. 1996) (maintaining that

palliative care "affirms life and regards dying as a normal process; neither hastens nor
postpones death; provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms; integrates the
psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care; offers a support system to help patients
live as actively as possible until death; offers a support system to help the family cope
during the patient's illness and their bereavement.").
289 See generally Erin Hoover, Suicide Laws Seem Unlikely Elsewhere,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Nov. 18, 1997, at A 01.
290

id.
291 Greg Retsinas, Activist Talks About Right to Die; The Hemlock Society

Founder Describes the Movement's Successes and Failures, SARASOTA HERALDTRIBUNE, Jan. 19, 1999, at B1.
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statute applies.292 In so doing, they have turned to aggressive pain
management as a solution that reaches a larger group of people.293
Palliative care is far from an accepted practice in the many
states that are in the process of expanding their pain management
laws. 294 Still, hospice workers regularly face the decision of how to
aid their patients in the final stages of terminal illness. These
decisions generally focus on how to make the patient most
comfortable during the latter stages of a terminal illness, not on how
to help the patient end his or her life.29 5 The philosophy behind this
growing movement is that the issue is not that patients wish to commit
suicide but, rather,
that people wish to avoid the pain associated with a
296
terminal illness.

Many people are concerned about whether it is possible to
effectively manage pain during a terminal illness and, if the pain can
not be managed, how the suffering can be relieved legally. 297 It is

possible that pain management, as it currently exists, will not work for
all. 298 However, any option that brings the discussion out in the open
where the doctor can address the patient's fears surrounding the end of
life may in fact diminish the desire to commit suicide.299
292Hoover, supra note 289, at A01; see also Oregon: New Restrictions For
Assisted-Suicide Law?, HEALTH LINE, Jan. 22, 1999 (describing the new bill that Sen.
Neil Bryant (R) has introduced in the Oregon Legislature to properly implement the

Death With Dignity Act by defining who is capable of making the decision to resort to
assisted suicide).
293See id. (stating that while aggressive use of pain medication may cause the

patient to die sooner, most groups find this less morally reprehensible than assisted
I
suicide).
294 See id. "Arizona, Washington, Florida, and potentially California, are
planning to propose bills next year that would put the patient even more in charge." Id.
295 Muriel Dobbin, Working to Improve the Last Days, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER, Nov. 16, 1997, at A21.
296Id. (advocating a move towards hospice care).
297 See id. (claiming that hospice patients and administrators believe what is
needed is not the legalization of assisted suicide, but rather a public policy on how to deal
with the pain management of the terminally ill).
298 See Newman, supra note 33, at 184, 185 (stating that improving pain
management is a worthwhile aspiration, but not under the pretext that it be an alternative
to the legalization of euthanasia because pain management does not work for all, and does
nothing to relieve the anxiety or psychological pain that is associated with terminal
illness).
299 See Scott, supra note 240, at 52.
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D. The Oregon State Debate and PendingFederalLegislation

In 1994, Oregon voters legalized assisted suicide when they
voted in favor of the Death with Dignity Act ("Act") by a slim margin
of 51% to 49%.300

This referendum was only the beginning.

An

injunction was instituted while the constitutionality of the Act was
being challenged. 30 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit dismissed the case on the grounds that
the plaintiffs lacked
30 2
standing, as they had not suffered any injury.
After the Supreme Court decisions in Vacco 30 3 and
Glucksberg,30 4 the Oregon legislature put the Death with Dignity Act

to another vote, with mail-in balloting that ended on November 4,
1997.30'

This time the voters passed the Act by a 60% majority and

the court lifted the injunction, making Oregon the first and only State
to legalize physician-assisted suicide.30 6 However, Senator Orrin G.
Hatch (R-Utah) and Representative Henry J. Hyde (R-IIl) sought to
ban the Act and contacted Thomas A. Constantine of the Federal Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA).3 °7

Subsequently, the DEA

announced that they would "revoke the federal narcotics licenses of

doctors who prescribe drugs to help terminally ill patients take their

300Linda Greenhouse, Assisted Suicide Clears a Hurdle in Highest Court,

N.Y.TIwEs, Oct. 15, 1997 at AI (stating that the Act - Measure 51- allowed "a mentally
competent adult suffering from a terminal illness - defined as likely to result in death
within six months - may receive lethal doses of medication after consulting with two
doctors and waiting 15 days.").
30 See id.
302 See id.; see also Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6249 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1992) (arguing that Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment because there was insufficient
protection in place to protect the depressed terminally-ill patient from committing
suicide).
303 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
304521 U.S. 702 (1997).
305See Greenhouse, supra note 300 at AI.
306

Id.

307 Timothy

Egan, Oregon Doctors Caught Between State and Federal Rules

on Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TrMms, Nov. 19, 1997.
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own lives. 3 °8 This move was directly in conflict with the
Supreme
309
Court's decision to leave the issue to the states to regulate.
Justice Department officials, after conducting a review of the
Oregon assisted suicide law, concluded that Oregon doctors who
followed the letter of the law would be free from repercussions for
participating in physician-assisted suicide.31 ° Officials believed the
DEA did not have the authority to interfere with physicians who
wished to prescribe lethal medication.3 1' Despite the fact that
Attorney General Janet Reno promised to address the issue quickly,
Oregon doctors still expressed a reluctance to rely on the Act. 3 12 On
June 5, 1998, the Attorney General ruled that the DEA was not
authorized to sanction Oregon doctors who complied with the Act.
The Attorney General stated that the DEA's enforcement mandate
"was intended to block drug trafficking and did not cover situations
like the Oregon suicide law. 313 However, if a doctor does not comply
with the letter of the law, then he or she is open to sanctions. In
addition, doctors from states that do not have a state statute such as
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act are liable for assisting in a
suicide." 4 Therefore, since Oregon is the only state to authorize the
practice, the Attorney General's revocation of the DEA ruling,
at
315
present, only applies to doctors practicing in the state of Oregon.
In response to the Attorney General's decision, legislation was
introduced that would overrule her decision. Some argue that this
308 See Terminally Ill Lose as Feds Pull Plug on Oregon Law, USA TODAY,
Nov. 12, 1997 at 22A.
309 See Gail Kinsey Hill, Oregon on Firmer Ground Than DEA on Assisted
Death, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 16, 1997, at A01 (stating that physician-assisted
suicide has the people's support and that the interference of the DEA may prove to be
beginning of a classic 10th Amendment battle).
310 See Justice Dept. Bars Oregon Doctors Aiding Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1998 at A7.
311 See id

312 See Across the USA: News from Every State, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1998

at 8A.

313 Neil A. Lewis, Reno Lift's Barrier to Oregon's Law on Aided Suicide,

NEW YORK TIMES, June 6, 1998 at AI(citing Janet Reno as stating that the DEA should
not be involved in such moral and ethical issues).
314 Assisted Suicide: Hatch Grills AG Reno at Hearing, HEALTH LINE, July
17, 1998 (discussing the debate between Janet Reno and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)).
"' See id
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new legislation entitled the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act is an

end run around Ms. Reno's ruling and is another attempt to prohibit
doctors from prescribing drugs on the federal list of controlled
substances when the doctor is aware that the patient is intending to use

the drugs to commit suicide.316

In effect, the bill would, repeal

Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. The 106th Congress will consider

the bill in conjunction with legislation pending on patients' bills of
rights. 7' The Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act has generated much
debate centering around its effect on palliative care. Many view the
Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act as detrimental to palliative care.318
Right-to-Die groups have seized the opportunity, not only to attempt
to block the legislation, but to introduce their own initiatives.3 19
However, proponents of the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act
believe that it will enable doctors to prescribe medication for pain
that, to date, they have not been able to prescribe for fear their actions

would be misinterpreted as an effort to assist in a suicide.32°
316

See Senate GOP Serves up Slimmer Version of Reform,

NATIONAL

CONGRESS DAILY, Jan. 28, 1999; see also Charles T. Canady, Assisted Suicide
Hearing Tomorrow, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES, July 13, 1998(stating that the
JOURNAL'S

legislation was introduced in the house by Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL) and Rep. James L
Oberstar (D-MN) and in the senate by Sen. Don Nickles (R-OK)).
311 See id.
318

See Overreachingon Assisted Suicide, NEW

YORK

TIMES, Sept. 17, 1998

at A30 (stating that "heavy-handed legislation" could in effect raise the number of
suicides by giving "Federal bureaucrats the new power to second-guess difficult medical
decisions...").
319 See Measure Filled with Pain, LOS ANGLES TIMES', Sept. 17, 1998 at B8
(stating that while there is a growing concern that palliative care will be abused in order to
keep health care costs down, the proposed bill would put the DEA in charge of pain
management); c.f Suicide Act Doesn't Ban Painkillers, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 19,

1999 at 4 (citing Sen. Don Nickles as stating that the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act
will allow drugs for legitimate medical purposes such as relieving pain, but that
illegitimate purposes such as prescribing drugs for assisted suicide will be prosecuted
under the Act); see also Cokie Roberts and Steven V. Roberts, The Best Policy is to Assist
Life, Not Encourage Death, Daily News, Nov. 26, 1998 at 67 (stating that the proposed
bill does not focus on the correct issues as it does nothing to educate those involved
concerning the issues of pain management).
320 Herbert Hendin, A Chance for Congress to Ease Pain, NEWSDAY, Sept.
30, 1998 at A39 (stating that the bill reinforces the Supreme Court's finding, and New
York State law, that there is a distinct difference between "intending to relieve suffering
and intending to cause death").
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In the meantime, during the debate between Janet Reno and
the DEA, Oregon put the law to the test for the first time. On March
25, 1998, a woman in her 80's suffering from terminal breast cancer
committed assisted suicide.32' The assisted suicide followed the
guidelines set forth by state officials, in that the patient's physician
prescribed the fatal medication, but did not administer it. 322 State

officials declined to report on the law until ten physician-assisted
suicides had been recorded.

23

However, all involved admit being

concerned over the efficacy of policing such a law. An additional
concern is whether the Death with Dignity Act will cause a drastic rise
in assisted suicides in Oregon. 2 ' These concerns were put to rest
when Oregon officials released a report stating that in 1998, the first
full year that the Act had been in effect, only 15 terminally ill patients
took their own lives, eight others had received prescriptions for fatal
doses of barbiturates but as of January 1, 1999, six had died naturally
and two were still alive.325
While the debate concerning the Oregon law still appears to be
undecided, there are indications that the national Right-to-Die
organizations are turning their attention to other states in which
similar debates are now being waged.326 Derek Humphry, founder of
the Hemlock Society, has recently been quoted as saying that the
Right-to-Die movement has "[their] foot in the door [and] will press
321

Timothy Egan, First Death Under an Assisted Suicide Law; Moving the

Debatefrom the Abstract to the Actual, N.Y.TMEs, Mar. 26, 1998 at A]4.
322 See id; see generally D.C. Acts Quickly on Oregon's Right-to Die Law,

SEATTLE-POST INTELLIGENCER, June 6, 1998 (stating that "the Oregon law requires two
doctors to agree that the patient has less than six months to live, is competent and has
made a voluntary decision.").
323 See id.
324 See id.
325 Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Reporting 15 Deaths in 1998 Under
Suicide Law, NEW YORK TiMES, Feb. 18, 1999 at Al.
326 See Mary J.Loftus, A Final Choice; Assisted Suicide Stirs Passionate
Debates From Both Sides; Special Report: Both Sides; Split Opinion: Now Floridians

View Suicide, THE LEDGER, Feb. 14, 1998 at Al (referring to legislation pending in
Maine, Michigan, and Arizona); see also Carol M. Ostrom, New Focus in Debate on
Assisted Suicide - What If Medications Used For Pain Control Speed Patient'sDeath?,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998 at Al (referring to the Compassion in Dying Federation,
one of the instrumental groups in the fight to legalize physician-assisted suicide, as
having as a new goal the improvement of aggressive pain relief).
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on, step by step. 327 Humphry believes that, despite the difficulty in
making progress on such a controversial issue, there is reason to
remain positive.32 s Despite having suffered recent high profile defeats
in Michigan and Seattle and the current controversy and debate
brewing in Congress over the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act, the
movement is very active in Maine and Alaska, and at the legislative
level.329 Likewise, Seattle's Compassion in Dying is also shifting their
focus to other states. The group is currently involved in a civil rights
suit being brought in Alaska which argues that Alaskans' right to
privacy is being infringed by Alaska's ban on assisted suicide.33
IV. CONCLUSION

The effects of the Supreme Court's decision in Vacco331 and in
Glucksberg 32 have yet to be completely felt, nor have the legislative
debates on the issue of physician-assisted suicide been resolved.3 33
When considering an issue as complex as assisted suicide, there will
be much public debate that will require a thorough analysis before any
finality comes to the right to die issue. 334 While the reaction is mixed,
in the words of Professor Laurence H. Tribe, one thing is
certain,"[t]he [Vacco] decision leaves the hard question for another
day. 335
See Retsinas, supra note 291 at Bl.
See id.(indicating that states as large as Florida are difficult to win, despite
widespread support, due to the complicated process involved in passing citizen
initiatives).
329 See id., see also Robin Williams Adams, Assisted-Suicide Advocate
Speaks, THE LEDGER, Jan. 20, 1999 at B3 (summarizing a speech by Derek Humphry on
the Right-to-Die movement).
330 See Alaska: Case Challenges Assisted-Suicide Ban, HEALTH LINE, Dec.
16, 1999 (discussing reaction to the current civil rights claim filed in Alaska Superior
Court).
331521 U.S. 844 (1997).
332 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
333 See supra notes 281-98 and accompanying text (examining the
alternatives to physician-assisted suicide).
34 See David Stout, From Emotional to Intellectual, Secular to Religious,
N.Y.TPES, June
27, 1997 at A18.
3
327
328

35

Id.
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Justice O'Connor's concurrence modifies Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court by maintaining that his opinion
should "not be read as an unqualified rejection of a constitutional right
to a physician's aid in dying., 336 As has often been noted, the use of
separate opinions is "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day." 337 We can all thank Justice O'Connor
for leaving this issue open for future debate. Her concurrence is
certain to allow debate on physician-assisted suicide to continue at the
state level.
Whether there is a State right is still an open question, or 50
open questions. However, the Supreme Court ultimately found no
federal constitutional right or liberty interest in physician-assisted
suicide. The Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the
338
conservative trend that has fueled the Rehnquist Court since Casey
and Cruzan.339 In fact, there has been a reluctance to expand
substantive due process or fundamental rights since the Burger
Court.34° When viewed in this light, the Supreme Court decision was
predictable. In the true spirit of a democratic society, there should be
room for the people to vote and voice their opinion on such a
controversial subject.
The Supreme Court decision in Vacco 34 ! may have been less

than favorable in the eyes of the Right-to-Die movement; however,
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act 42 and the Supreme Court's
Vacco343 decision have both spawned much publicity and public
debate.'" Public debate is positive, and while there will always be
336 Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Appealing to the Law's Brooding Spirit,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 1997, at A4.
337 Id.(referring to the use of a dissenting opinion, however, a concurrence or
plurality decision, as we have seen with Vacco, can have the same effect).
338 Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
339Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (tracing back this trend of conservative
thinking, Rehnquist's dissent in Roe v. Wade can be seen as a starting point for this line of
rationale).
340
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. 411 U.S. at 1.
14'
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
342 See Glucksburg, 117 S.Ct. at 2258.
14'
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
344In 1998, there were more than 3,000 newspaper articles alone and
numerous forums and public debates on the subject.
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those who argue that physician-assisted suicide is the beginning of the
slippery slope towards euthanasia,345 it is my contention that what is
really at issue is a person's right to end his or her life with dignity and
integrity. Although it one could argue that physician-assisted suicide
laws may be difficult to enforce, that difficulty should not be
considered a valid reason to avoid the task.
In conclusion, it is easy to delay thinking about these issues,
but it is impossible to avoid the inevitable. Admittedly, reading about
the pain and helplessness that may accompany death is distressing, but
not nearly as emotionally devastating as when the issue of death is
upon you or someone close to you and the options are limited. For
this reason, I believe that the more information disseminated about the
options available regarding end of life decisions including palliative
care, the better. In this respect, Vacco346 has had a positive effect.
Kim C. Arestad

345 See Linda Chavez, Oregon's Physician-AssistedSuicide Law May Give
Us Anything but Dignity in Death, BALTIMORE SuN, Apr., 1, 1998, at 13A (alleging that
the good publicity resonating from the first use of the Oregon physician-assisted suicide
law is overshadowed by the mercy killings at Glendale Adventist Medical Center, where
a respiratory technician "viewed himself as an 'angel of mercy,' who sometimes hastened
the death of patients 'who looked like they were ready to die'.").
346

521 U.S. 793 (1997).

